This paper examines the relationship between family control and dividend policy in Indonesia. There are three possible explanations for the relationship. The expropriation hypothesis predicts that family control has a negative impact on dividend payouts. Meanwhile the reputation hypothesis and the family income hypothesis predict that family control has a positive impact on dividend payouts. Using a panel data of Indonesian publicly listed firms in the period of 2003-2009, the results shows that family control has a significant negative impact on dividend payouts, dividend yields and likelyhood to pay dividends. The results control for other variables that may potentially affect dividend payments such as growth opportunity, debt, profitability, firm size and firm age. From agency theory perspective, the finding is consistent with the argument that family controlling shareholders prefer lower dividends, in order to preserve cash flows that they can potentially expropriate (the expropriation hypothesis). 
This paper examines the relationship between family control and dividend policy in Indonesia. There are three possible explanations for the relationship. The expropriation hypothesis predicts that family control has a negative impact on dividend payouts. Meanwhile the reputation hypothesis and the family income hypothesis predict that family control has a positive impact on dividend payouts. Using a panel data of Indonesian publicly listed firms in the period of [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] , the results shows that family control has a significant negative impact on dividend payouts, dividend yields and likelyhood to pay dividends. The results control for other variables that may potentially affect dividend payments such as growth opportunity, debt, profitability, firm size and firm age. From agency theory perspective, the finding is consistent with the argument that family controlling shareholders prefer lower dividends, in order to preserve cash flows that they can potentially expropriate (the expropriation hypothesis). 2003-2009, hasil (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Faccio et al., 2001 ).
Artikel ini meneliti hubungan antara kendali perusahaan oleh keluarga (family control) dengan kebijakan dividen di Indonesia. The expropriation hypothesis memprediksi bahwa family control memiliki pengaruh negatif terhadap pembayaran dividen. Sementara itu, The Reputation Hypothesis dan the Family Income Hypothesis memprediksi family control memiliki hubungan yang positif dengan pembayaran dividen. Menggunakan panel data terdiri atas perusahaan publik yang tercatat di Bursa Efek Indonesia periode
On the other hand, controlling families may opt to build up a reputation of treating minority shareholder well by paying higher dividend payouts (reputation hypothesis) (Gomes, 2000; Myers, 2000) . In addition, in general controlling families have a considerable amount of their wealth invested in their firm. Since controlling families do not want to reduce their shareholdings and lose their control, dividend payments are the only possible way for them to obtain an income (family income hypothesis) (Isakov and Weisskopf, 2015) .
Both arguments predict a positive impact of family control on dividend payouts.
Extant studies which have examined the relationship between dividend policy and family control have produced mixed results. For example, Gugler (2003) find that family controlled by families in Austria do not engage in dividend smoothing, choose lower target payout levels, and are less reluctant to cut dividends compared to other firms. Villalonga and Amit (2006) , using a sample of Fortune 500 firms, find that family firms in U.S. tend to have significantly lower dividend payout ratios. Faccio et al. (2001) In contrast, Setia-Atmaja (2010) report that family controlled firms in Australia pay higher dividends than non-family firms. Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2010) who study Japanese firms document higher dividend pay-outs for family firms. Pindado et al. (2012) who examine firms in nine Eurozone countries find that family firms tend to have higher dividend pay-outs and that they tend to smooth their dividends more. Schmid et al. (2010) who study German listed firms find that family firms have higher pay-outs and also a higher likelihood to pay dividends. Finally, Isakov and Weisskopf (2015) indicated that family firms in Swiss display significantly higher dividend pay-outs relative to companies with other ownership structures.
Meanwhile, Silva et al. (2004) indicate that, family control in Germany has little impact on dividend policy. Similar result is also reported by Chen et al. (2005) who study firms in Hong Kong.
There is a main reason why study of the impact of family control on dividend policy in Indonesia is important. Family controlled firms are prevalent in Indonesia (Claessens et al., 2000 To the best of my knowledge, this research is the first to examine the relationship between family control and dividend policy in Indonesia.
Therefore the research results should contribute to the dividend and ownership structure (family business) literature development, as well as provide practical contribution for regulator and investor in capital market.
Literature Review
The finance literature suggests that dividends can be used as a mechanism to mitigate the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders (i.e., agency problems) because it decrease free cash flows that can be misused otherwise (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Faccio et al., 2001) . and Johnson et al. (2000b) . They describe the transfer of firm resources to controlling shareholders as "tunneling". Furthermore, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that controlling shareholders, including families, may extract private benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders (expropriation argument).
Meanwhile La Porta et al. (2000) posit that dividends can play an important role in mitigating Agency Problem II. Like Jensen (1986) , they suggest that dividend payments guarantee a pro-rata payout for all shareholders and reduce corporate wealth from controlling shareholders. As such, dividends are ideal mechanism for limiting minority shareholder wealth expropriation. Therefore, the literature suggests that the presence of Agency Problem II is associated to lower dividend pay-outs in family controlled firms.
In contrast, Myers (2000) argues that managers tend to pay dividend pay-outs just large enough to avoid conflicts with shareholders. Furthermore, Gomes (2000) develops this idea and argues that large shareholders such as families may choose to build up a reputation of treating minority shareholders well. His model assumes that controlling families or other large shareholders will not expropriate minority shareholders. The author posits that family members may attempt to pay just enough dividends to minority shareholders to keep them satisfied. The family will build a reputation for treating them well by paying higher dividend payouts. As a consequence, this would limit the misuse of the firm excess cash. Isakov and Weisskopf (2015) argue that this reputation building behavior can also be justified by the «substitution model» of La Porta et al. (2000) that posits that firms tend to pay higher dividends when they plan to issue new equity in the near future. Since family firms tend to have weaker governance than non-family firms due to ineffective internal governance mechanisms, investors may hesitate to buy new stocks offered by family firms. Higher dividend payouts can therefore act as a substitute for the weaker internal governance mechanisms. Thus, the literature suggests that the willingness to build a good reputation by controlling families leads family firms to pay higher dividend payouts.
Family ownership has two unique features (Isakov and Weisskopf, 2015; Anderson and Reeb, 2003) . variables. This may arise due to the exclusion of unmeasured explanatory variables that nevertheless still affect firm behaviour. Our family control (dummy) variable is relatively stable over the period and consistent with the notion that families generally control their firms for long periods. Therefore, the random effects model 1 When a firm makes losses and has negative retained profits in a given year, it is legally unable to pay dividends 2 A thirty five per cent threshold is the control threshold adopted in Indonesia's takeover regulation is considered more appropriate than the fixed effects one in this study (Kennedy, 2003 Rozeff, 1982; Jensen et al., 1992) . Profitability (measured by net income divided by total assets).
A positive relationship between firm profitability and dividend is expected as dividend is paid from net income. Firm Size (measured by the natural logarithm of total asset) -Larger firms tend to have better access to capital markets, which reduces their dependence on internally generated funding and allows for higher dividend-payout ratios (Aivazian and Cleary, 2003) . Growth Opportunity (measured by annual sales growth in the last 3 years) -A negative relationship between Dividend and Growth Opportunity is expected as high growth firms may have lower dividend payouts due to their larger investment requirements and a tendency to retain funds to avoid external financing with its attendant costs (Rozeff, 1982; Fama and French, 2001 Family firms represent 81.4 percent of the sample. However, growth opportunity is insignificantly different. Table 2 presents the estimation of Equation (1) using random effects regressions with dividend payout ratio as dependent variable (Column 1) and dividend yield as dependent variable (Column 2). Supporting Hypothesis 1 and consistent with the expropriation hypothesis, results in Column 1 of Table 2 indicates that family firms have a lower dividend payout ratio. Dividend payout ratio is also negatively associated with debt, and positively associated with firm size and firm age.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Descriptive Statistics
Univariate Analysis
Panel Regression Analysis
Dividend payout ratio is positively associated with profitability and growth opportunity, but not significant at the 10 per cent level.
As robustness check, I use dividend yield to replace dividend payout ratio in Equation (1). Column 2 of Table 2 presents the result using random effects regressions. In general, I find the same result as in Column 1 of Table 3 . That is, family firms have a lower dividend yield, which supports Hypothesis 1 and is consistent with the expropriation hypothesis.
Dividend yield is also negatively associated with debt, and positively associated with firm size and firm age. The coefficients of profitability and growth opportunity variables become significantly positive, suggesting that profitable firms and firms with higher growth opportunity tend to pay higher dividends.
In addition to analyses using dividend payout ratio and dividend yield as dependent variables, I use dummy variable to capture the firm's likelihood to pay dividends. The relationship between a firm's likelihood to pay dividends and family control is examined using random effects logit regression. Table 4 reports the estimations of equation 1 which includes the binary dividend The likelihood to pay dividends is also negatively associated with debt, and positively associated with profitability, growth opportunity, firm size and firm age.
The possible explanation for the results is that in country with weak legal minority shareholder protection like Indonesia, family firms tend to pay lower dividend payouts in order to preserve cash that they may potentially misuse. The results differs from extant research conducted in countries with stronger minority shareholder protection than Indonesia, such as Australia (Setia-Atmaja, 2010), Japan (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010) , Eurozone countries (Pindado et al., 2012) , Germany (Schmid et al., 2010) and Swiss (Isakov and Weisskopf, 2015) . Wald Chi-Square -*** significant at the 0.01 level ** significant at the 0.05 level * significant at the 0.10 level 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
